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Can the Anglo-Scottish Union
Survive Brexit?




1 Among the foreign observers of Scotland’s peculiar political and constitutional status,
none  was  more  acute  than  Jacques  Leruez.  His  book  L'Écosse.  Une  Nation  sans  État
introduced French readers to the idea that nation and state are distinct concepts and,
in the United Kingdom, different political realities. In a series of publications over the
years, he explored the nature of the relationship of Scotland to the wider British state
and the  complex  meanings  of  union as  multinational  compromise.  As  a  student  of
territorial politics and statecraft, he was able to trace the multiple ways – economic,
social and political – in which Scotland was integrated, without being assimilated, into
the wider state. British unionism was very different from French Jacobinism and could
accept differentiation in culture, education, law and social policies. The one thing it
could never concede was the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament. For a century,
this  meant  that  British  governments  would  not  bow to  demands  for  home rule  or
devolution,  fearing that  this  could lead to  federalism and erosion of  parliamentary
sovereignty or even to secession.
2 At  the  end  of  the  twentieth  century,  this  obstacle  was  removed  as  the  Labour
Government set up devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The
sovereignty question was dealt with in a summary clause asserting that none of this
affected the union or the right of the Westminster Parliament to legislate in all parts of
the country. There followed a convention (the Sewel Convention) stating that it would
not  “normally”  do  so.  Of  course,  many  people  in  Scotland  did  not  accept  this
interpretation, insisting that Scotland had its own tradition of sovereignty, that the
Acts of Union did not mean that the English tradition of sovereignty had passed to the
new Parliament of Great Britain, and that the devolution referendum of 1997 was an act
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of  self-determination.  In  true  British  fashion,  however,  people  were  left  to  believe
different things and relations between the two parliaments were generally cooperative,
even when the Scottish National Party (SNP) was in power in Holyrood and Labour and
then the Conservatives ruled at Westminster.
3 A critical factor in this was membership of the European Union and of the European
Convention  on  Human  Rights  (ECHR)  (under  the  Council  of  Europe),  which  have
transformed the meaning of sovereignty and statehood in Europe. As sovereignty is
divided  and  shared  in  Europe,  it  provides  a  discursive  space  for  ideas  of  post-
sovereignty,  which  many  nationalist  and  regionalist  movements  in  Europe  have
adopted.1 Post-sovereignty does not mean that sovereignty has disappeared but that it
has been transformed and is no longer monolithic and located only in the nation-state.
The  Northern  Ireland  settlement  explicitly  invites  citizens  to  choose  whichever
combination  of  identities  (Irish,  British,  Northern  Irish,  European)  they  prefer  and
gives these institutional expression. Most Scots, rather than being torn between British
and Scottish identities, combine these in varying proportions. The SNP’s embrace of
Europe from the mid-1980s was a recognition that independence is not isolation but
rather  a  change  in  the  complex  web  of  interdependencies  in  which  the  nation  is
located. Radical visions of a Europe of the (small) Nations or Europe of the Regions may
have come to little, but nationalities movements in Europe do see it as a framework for
greater autonomy and protagonism. During the independence referendum campaign of
2014, both sides were committed to Europe, differing only on the best way to stay in it.
Unionists argued that an independent Scotland would be excluded from the EU, while
nationalists warned that, without independence, Scotland risked being dragged out of
the EU by a Eurosceptic England. With the consensus on Europe, the argument then
came down to managing the various unions. SNP leader Alex Salmond even argued that
Scotland  was  currently  in  six  unions  –  political,  monarchical,  monetary,  defence,
European, and social – and proposed withdrawing only from the first.
4 Europe provided an economic framework for independence, by guaranteeing free trade
and free movement. The Single Market allowed a more generous measure of devolution
in economic matters than would have otherwise been possible, as it also secured the
internal market of the United Kingdom. Industrial policy, aid to industry, agriculture,
fisheries and the environment were all devolved to Scotland, within the scope of EU
law, which itself was directly applicable in Scotland. The only role for the UK in these
fields was to secure a common negotiating position in the Council  of  the European
Union. 
5 The EU and the ECHR ensured a common regime of rights not only across the EU but
within  the  UK.  This  is  of  vital  importance  in  Northern  Ireland  and  Scotland,  as  it
separates the question of human rights from citizenship and identity. That is crucial in
territories  where  substantial  parts  of  the  population do  not  identify  as  British  but
where equality of rights is important. ECHR rulings, whether by domestic courts or the
European Court of Human Rights, are directly applicable in devolved fields in Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland. In reserved fields and in England, on the other hand, they
do not bind Parliament and the courts can only bring breaches of the convention to its
attention. 
6 Europe also serves to lower the importance of borders, so helping to bring together the
two parts of Ireland without changing their constitutional status. It also eases cross-
border issues between England and Scotland and, in the case of Scottish independence,
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would  have  prevented  the  emergence  of  a  hard  border,  assuming  that  both  states
remained in the EU.
7 A central  concern  of  supporters  of  Brexit  is  to  reassert  the  sovereignty  of  the  UK
Parliament,  to  “bring  back  control”.  According  to  them,  there  is  a  fundamental
contradiction between the European project, with its supranational pretentions, and
the  British  constitution,  rooted  in  the  unassailable  supremacy  of  the  unitary
Parliament.  In  Scotland,  however,  a  different  conception  of  the  state  prevails,
according to which the United Kingdom is a plurinational union of nations, with no
single people (demos)  and no shared aim or end-point (telos).  It  is  open to multiple
interpretations,  which  co-exist  in  practice  if  not  in  theory  and  are  constantly
negotiated. Sovereignty is not settled but constantly questioned. For some the union is
about economics,  while others stress history, common sentiment or shared welfare.
Understood  in  this  sense,  there  is  a  fundamental  compatibility  or  ‘goodness  of  fit’
between the UK constitutional order and that of Europe, which is based precisely on
these ideas and has survived by not defining them too rigidly. 
8 Neither  the UK or  the EU is  a  federation but  they do share key federal  principles.
British devolution has evolved over twenty years  as  the institutions have matured.
Northern  Ireland  has  its  own  dynamics  and  the  settlement  has  experienced  serial
crises. Scotland has gained more powers, most recently over taxation and aspects of
welfare. The National Assembly for Wales has followed Scotland in gaining legislative
powers and more competences. In the final days of the Scottish referendum campaign
of 2014, former Prime Minister Gordon Brown rallied the unionist parties to promise
more powers, calling for the UK to be as much like a federal system as was possible
within the British constitution. There followed the Smith Commission and the Scotland
Act (2016), which stipulated that the Scottish Parliament was a permanent feature of
the constitution, which could be abolished only by referendum of the Scottish people,
and put the Sewel Convention into law. Of course, if the Westminster Parliament is still
sovereign, it is not bound by this Act but the move did appear to be a federalizing one
and it was understood that Westminster was committing itself to legislative restraint.
 
Scotland and Europe
9 During the 1970s, Scotland was comparatively Eurosceptic. In the 1975 referendum on
continued membership of the European Communities, it voted to remain by a smaller
majority than did England. Both the Labour and Scottish National parties were largely
opposed to the EC. In the mid-1980s, both Labour and the SNP changed positions and
committed themselves to membership of  the European Union.  For the SNP,  Europe
provided a framework for independence, rebutted charges of “separatism” and offered
guarantees  of  market  access.  Some  nationalists  accepted  the  full  implications  of
Europe, that an independent Scotland would not be fully sovereign.2 Others were more
wary, favouring an intergovernmental Europe of the Nations. From this point, Scots
started to look on Europe less sceptically than did the English, a reverse of the position
in the 1970s. This was not, however, because nationalist voters bought the argument
about independence in Europe. There was no correlation whatever between views on
independence and on Europe.3 Hard-line nationalists in Scotland, which includes those
who want complete and immediate independence and those British nationalists who
would do away with the Scottish Parliament (a  much smaller  number)  were rather
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Eurosceptic. In the middle of both the nationalist-unionist and Europhile-Eurosceptic
spectra, on the other hand, there was a strong correlation between supporting more
devolution  and  moderate  pro-Europeanism.  These  are  the  consistently  post-
sovereigntist  voters,  found in all  the parties.  SNP voters were not particularly pro-
European and less so than Labour voters. Survey evidence suggests that, in England,
support for Brexit is strongly related to feeling English rather than British. In Scotland,
national identity has no such effect.
10 A notable feature of Scottish politics is the low salience of immigration and European
free movement, compared with England. Surveys have shown that Scottish voters are
not particularly pro-immigration but all parties in the Scottish Parliament have framed
immigration as a demographic and economic issue, a vital means to sustain Scotland’s
population rather than a threat. This has served to contain one of the main drivers of
Brexit sentiment. 
11 These factors ensured that, in the 2016 Brexit referendum, while England and Wales
voted narrowly to  leave the EU,  Scotland voted by a  large margin to  remain,  with
remain majorities across all parts of the country and across all parties. 
 






Northern Ireland 44 56
12 It was immediately apparent that, with Northern Ireland also voting to remain (but
divided  between  the  two  communities),  Brexit  posed  a  serious  challenge  to  the
territorial constitution of the United Kingdom. What was less clear was how this could
work out. We can discuss this according to three scenarios, which have yet to play out
fully.  One  is  recentralization  as  the  UK reconstitutes  itself  as  a  unitary  state  after
Brexit. Another is disintegration, as the Scotland and Northern Ireland remain in the




13 There have been a number of signs that Brexit could entail a recentralization of the
state and a reversal of the federalizing trend that has prevailed since 1999. The first
was the insistence by the UK Government, without consulting the devolved nations,
that  the  whole  state  would  withdraw.  As  ministers  constantly  repeated,  this  was  a
decision by “the British people”, implying a unitary demos that had spoken as one. They
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had earlier rejected suggestions that Brexit might require concurrent majorities across
the UK nations. 
14 A  second  instance  was  the  case  in  the  Supreme  Court  brought  by  Gina  Miller
concerning whether the UK Government needed the consent of Parliament to activate
Article 50 of the EU treaty, to begin the withdrawal process. The position of the UK
Government was that triggering Article 50 did not require parliamentary approval at
all  but,  as  “foreign  policy”,  could  be  done  under  prerogative  powers.  The  Scottish
Government  joined  the  action,  claiming  that  it  would  also  trigger  the  need  for
legislative  consent  under  the  Sewel  Convention,  as  Brexit  entailed  changing  their
devolution settlements (by removing the application of EU law). The UK Supreme Court
(2017) ruled that the UK Government did indeed need parliamentary approval but not
that of the devolved legislatures.4 Rather than ruling on the narrow ground that EU
relations were a reserved matter and thus not subject to the Sewel Convention, the
Court added that Sewel was a mere “political” convention having no binding force in
any circumstances. At a stroke it thus emptied the efforts in 2016 and 2017 to entrench
it, and undermined a pillar of the devolution settlement. In fact, the Supreme Court
declined to enter into a constitutional argument, treating parliamentary sovereignty as
a simple fact rather than a complex concept that might have to be reconsidered in the
light of devolution. 
15 A third instance concerns the negotiations for withdrawal. The UK Government took
the position that this was a matter for it alone that the devolved bodies would only be
consulted along with other stakeholders. This differed from the position in normal EU
negotiations  where  matters  touching on devolved competences  are  discussed in  an
intergovernmental  forum,  the  Joint  Ministerial  Committee.  Eventually,  the  UK
Government agreed to establish a Joint Ministerial Committee (European Negotiations)
but  this  did  not  have  a  substantive  role  in  the  negotiations  themselves.  It  did  not
debate the main issues  in  advance of  European negotiations and Scottish ministers
complained  that  they  were  not  informed  in  time  of  upcoming  issues  or  given  the
requisite papers on time. On the other hand, this may suit the political purposes of the
Scottish Government which was opposed to Brexit and not necessarily interested in
helping it to happen.
16 The fourth issue concerns those competences that are devolved to Scotland but subject
to European law. Agriculture, fisheries, environment, regional economic development
and,  in  Scotland  and  Northern  Ireland,  large  parts  of  Justice  and  Home  Affairs
competence are not reserved to Westminster. This means that, unless the devolution
statutes  themselves  were  amended,  these  competences  would  after  Brexit  revert
directly to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Only in respect of England would they
come back to Westminster. 
17 Repatriation is  not,  however,  clear  cut.  Regulation and support  for  agriculture  and
fisheries are devolved, but not trade. Whatever trade deals the UK signs with the UK or
others will include rules on agricultural support, as would falling back on World Trade
Organization  rules.  There  is  also  the  fact  the  EU  framework  is  responsible  for
maintaining a single market, including fair competition and regulatory harmonization,
within  the  UK  itself.  Environmental  policies  have  external  effects  that  need  to  be
managed in common. 
18 The  UK  Government’s  initial  interpretation  was  that,  currently,  the  devolved
governments “are responsible for implementing the common policy frameworks set by
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the EU” rather than making policy. Taking back the powers would thus not reduce their
ability to take decisions. Moreover, “when the UK leaves the EU, the powers which the
EU currently exercises in relation to the common frameworks will return to the UK”.5
19 This  interpretation  was  strongly  disputed  by  all  the  devolved  administrations  who
argued that after Brexit  the current frameworks will  cease to exist  as they are the
product of EU law and there is no provision for them in UK law. They did come to
accept that common UK frameworks might be needed but not that this would justify
Westminster taking back the competences.
20 The initial EU Withdrawal Bill proposed that all the relevant powers would come under
the heading of “retained EU law” and come back to Westminster. In due course, some of
them could be “released” back to the devolved legislatures. In a rare show of unity, all
parties in the Scottish Parliament refused to give legislative consent (as did the Welsh
Government)  and  the  UK  Government  was  forced  to  retreat.  Amendments  were
introduced  providing  that  only  selected  competences  would  be  taken  back  to
Westminster  and  they  would  be  released  after  a  maximum  of  seven  years.  The
reservation of powers would be done by statutory instrument (decree) and would be
subject  to  consent  provisions  by  the  devolved  legislatures.  The  concession  was
undermined, however, by the new clause specifying exactly how the consent provisions
were to work. If the devolved legislatures agreed to the orders, they would go ahead; if
they refused consent, the orders would go ahead; and if they did not state an opinion,
they would go ahead. While in a strict legal sense, this would not change anything, as
Westminster has always claimed the right to proceed without consent under the Sewel
Convention, the provision, like the Supreme Court judgment, served to emphasize that
such  conventions  really  count  for  nothing.  It  thus  represents  a  setback  for  the
federalizing trend that has been under way since the devolution settlement of 1999,
which itself was reaffirmed by the unionist parties in the Scotland Act of 2016.
 
Disintegration
21 Immediately after the vote, the Scottish First Minister declared that another Scottish
independence referendum was likely in order to keep Scotland in the EU. In March 2017
the Scottish Parliament, with a pro-independence majority consisting of the SNP and
Greens, passed a resolution supporting another referendum. They claimed a mandate
for this on the grounds that the SNP manifesto for the 2016 Scottish elections had said
that there would not be a new independence referendum unless there was a material
change of circumstances such as Scotland being taken out of the EU against its will.
This  is  exactly  what  had  happened.  The  unionist  response  was  that  the  2014
referendum result was still binding. 
22 Independence  in  Europe,  however,  does  not  provide  a  simple  answer.  Since  the
mid-1980s the SNP have argued for independence-in-Europe as a way of softening the
impact of secession, avoiding hard borders and providing an external support system
for a small independent nation; other European nationalist movements make the same
argument. Yet an integral part of the argument was that, with the Kingdom also inside
the EU, there would be no hard border between them and no obstacle to trade. With
Scotland in the EU and the UK outside, there would be a hard economic border. This is a
vital matter, as Scotland does about four times as much trade with the rest of the UK as
with the EU 27. 
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23 There  was  some  debate  at  the  time  of  the  2014  referendum  about  whether  an
independent  Scotland  would  be  allowed  into  the  EU.  José  Manuel  Barroso,  then
President of  the European Commission,  pronounced that it  would be “difficult  if  not
impossible”. There was, however, no legal basis for this and most academic observers
agreed that as,  under the Edinburgh Agreement, an independent Scotland would be
recognized by the United Kingdom, there was no reason for any other state to refuse
recognition.6 Given  that  it  was  a  liberal  democracy  and  market  economy  already
meeting the acquis communautaire, there were no grounds for excluding it. The Spanish
Foreign Minister even conceded that Spain would follow the UK line7 and in 2017 his
successor  made the point  explicit.8 The difficulties,  rather,  hinge on the process  of
accession  and  whether  Scotland  would  inherit  the  UK  terms  of  membership.  It  is
unlikely that the EU would simultaneously negotiate Brexit and Scottish accession but,
if the latter had not been agreed by the time the UK leaves the EU, Scotland could be
left in limbo. 
24 Another  possibility  is  that  Scotland  could  opt  for  membership  of  the  European
Economic Area (EEA). In that case, it would be within the Single Market but not within
the customs union and so able also to negotiate a free trade agreement with the United
Kingdom. It would also be outside the Common Fisheries Policy, a contentious point in
Scotland. On the other hand, negotiating EEA membership might be no less complex
than getting into the EU and it would mean that Scotland, like Norway, would have to
accept Single Market policies without having a role in making them. 
25 Brexit did not, as widely expected, produce an increase in support for independence,
which remained at the same level (around 45 per cent) as it  had since the Scottish
independence  referendum.  As  noted  above,  not  all  SNP voters  support  the  EU and
around a third of them had voted for Brexit. Taking votes for independence and for
Brexit together, the result is as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Support for EU and independence in Scotland




Chris Prosser and Ed Fieldhouse, A tale of two referendums – the 2017 election in Scotland, British
Election Study, http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-findings/a-tale-of-two-referendums-the-2017-
election-in-scotland/#.WeoCaDb9O7M
26 It is clear from this that there is no combination of positions on the independence and
European questions that commands majority support in Scotland. The difficulty was
illustrated, and compounded, when the UK Government called a general election in
2017. The SNP, which had won 56 of the 59 Scottish seats in 2015, remained the largest
party but was reduced to 35 seats. The Conservatives experienced a significant revival,
gaining twelve seats at  the expense of  the SNP,  largely because of  the latter’s  pro-
European stance. With thirteen seats at Westminster (following their second place in
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the Scottish elections of 2016), the Scottish Conservatives became a significant force in
Scottish politics for the first time in thirty years. 
27 Finally, the Scottish Government would require the consent of the UK Government in
order to repeat the 2014 referendum. The UK Government response was not to rule out
an independence referendum in Scotland but to declare that this is not the time. It thus
once again side-stepped the issue of principle of whether Scotland has a right to self-
determination,  while  retaining control  of  the issue.  The Scottish Government could
perhaps organize its own referendum on a question that could be within the law but
this would carry little conviction. The unionists could simply boycott the campaign and
the vote, thus depriving it of legitimacy. In the event, the fall in support for the SNP at




28 This leaves the option of differentiation for the devolved territories. There have been
efforts  to  find  a  new middle  ground,  both  between  nationalism and  unionism and
between remaining in and leaving the EU, by allowing parts of the UK to remain in the
EU at least for some purposes. Yet differentiation is more difficult in relation to EU
membership than it is within the United Kingdom itself since the EU is based on law
and on political compromises that are difficult to unwind. 
29 The Scottish Government proposed that, if the UK is going to leave the EU, including
the Single Market, then Scotland would remain in the Single Market even as England
and Wales left.9 This would give it a status analogous to that of the European Economic
Area (EEA); indeed Scotland might formally become part of the EEA. As with the EEA,
agriculture and fisheries would be excluded. If the UK were to leave the EU customs
union (as it declared it would), Scotland would also leave, remaining in a customs union
with the UK. This would allow it to avoid tariffs and rules of origin on trade in goods
between Scotland and the rest  of  the UK and thus obviate  the need for  a  physical
border. There would be full access to the Single Market in services and provision for
the  free  movement  of  workers  between Scotland and the  EU-27.  All  parties  in  the
Scottish Parliament favour free movement and there is a broad consensus in favour of
immigration,  in  contrast  to  England.  Scotland would participate  in  European social
provisions, academic exchange and research and in aspects of EU Justice and Home
Affairs policies.
30 These proposals are legally and technically feasible, although they do pose challenges.
Being  in  a  customs  union  with  the  UK and  a  Single  Market  with  the  EU could  be
complex. Retaining a customs union with the UK could remove the need for physical
checks on goods traded between Scotland and England. There would, however, need to
be  rules  governing  the  treatment  of  goods  entering  the  UK  from  EU  countries,
depending on whether they were destined for Scotland or for England and Wales (we
leave Northern Ireland aside here as it too might have a differentiated settlement). The
Scottish Government concedes that there would have to be certification as to the final
point of sale of such goods. There would also have to be rules of origin if intermediate
goods were passing through England and Wales en route for Scotland.
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31 There would be a virtual border in services to the degree that EU and UK rules diverged
after Brexit. This could be avoided by double compliance rules to ensure that Scottish
services were compliant with both UK and EU regulations. 
32 Free movement of workers between Scotland and the EU would require controls to
ensure that EU workers did not come into Scotland in order to cross the border to work
in England. This is not an insuperable problem since a similar mechanism operates in
the Schengen area for third-country nationals with the right to work in one member
state but not in another. It would be monitored at the place of work rather than at the
border. There would also have to be provisions to define a Scottish worker, for the
purposes of rights to work in member states of the EEA.
33 In order for Scotland to remain compliant with Single Market regulations, the Scottish
Parliament and Government would require new competences across a wide range of
Single Market matters that are currently reserved to Westminster. 
34 In the event, the UK Government refused to entertain any territorial differentiation on
Brexit and these proposals did not feature in the UK negotiation with the EU, as they
would  have  had  to  in  order  to  be  feasible.  The  Scottish  Government  nevertheless,
continued to seek means for keeping Scotland aligned with Europe in so far as possible.
In response to the UK Withdrawal Act, it introduced its own bill (commonly known at
the  Continuity  Bill).  The  main  intention  of  this  was  to  enshrine  current  EU
competences (within devolved fields) in Scottish law, so preventing them being taken
back by Westminster. It also, however, contained provision for aligning Scottish law
with EU law and updating it, through a fast procedure that would not require primary
legislation  each time.  The  UK Government  referred  the  bill  to  the  Supreme Court,
claiming  that  it  was  ultra  vires.  This  gave  its  law  officers  another  opportunity  to
rehearse their doctrine of Westminster supremacy and even to go back to their original
argument that all EU powers, including in devolved fields, would revert to Westminster
if nothing else were done. Such claims represent a further undermining of the spirit of
devolution as a form of federalism.
 
Scotland, the EU and Europe
35 Europe  has  provided  a  vital  external  support  system  for  devolution  in  the  United
Kingdom, allowing its transformation into a form of asymmetrical and quasi-federal
state embedded in a complex system of shared sovereignty and interdependence. This
has accorded with the aspiration of the largest number of Scots. While Westminster
never formally surrendered sovereignty either to the EU or to Scotland, practice and
convention meant  that  in  effect  power  was  shared and constitutional  clashes  were
avoided.  There has been little litigation about Scotland’s powers and almost all  the
cases have involved European law rather than the domestic settlement. This is difficult
to sustain in the context of Brexit. A paradoxical effect of the Brexit referendum, which
was ostensibly about reasserting the sovereignty of the British Parliament, was in fact
to undermine that sovereignty and both Conservative and Labour parties insisted that
the supreme rule was the will of the people, before which Parliament must bow. Yet
once the popular will  is  introduced,  the question arises of  who are the people and
whether there is just one demos in the United Kingdom. The Scottish vote to remain was
substantially  larger than the overall  UK majority  to  leave,  and arguably provides a
quite separate mandate.
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36 For some years, the Conservative Party has proposed to repeal or modify the Human
Rights Act, which incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law.
Instead, there would be a British Bill of Rights. Proponents of this idea seemed initially
unaware that the ECHR was also incorporated into the law of the devolved territories,
so that their devolution statutes would also have to be amended. Yet that provision has
served  an  important  stabilizing  role  by  separating  nationality  from  rights  and
providing  a  nationally  neutral  framework  for  ruling  on  them.  When this  has  been
pointed  out,  opponents  of  the  ECHR  have  fallen  into  confusion,  some  of  them
suggesting that the British Bill of Rights might be confined to England and others just
wanting to go ahead anyway. The proposal has been put on hold during the debate on
membership of the EU but is likely to resurface in the future and will put a further
strain on the union. Once again, it is unionists who are putting the union at risk.
37 The travails of the UK Government following the triggering of Article 50 in March 2017
demonstrated that the idea of sovereignty is much more complex than supporters of
Brexit supposed. By the summer of 2018, the UK Government had retreated on their
sweeping  proposals  to  take  back  powers  from  the  devolved  legislatures,  while  not
conceding on their right to do so. At the European Elections in May 2019, the SNP ran
on a strongly pro-European platform, joining the Liberal Democrats and Greens in
calling for a second EU referendum to reverse Brexit. These pro-EU parties gained over
60 per cent of the vote while the Brexit Party (which led in England and Wales) was far
behind at less than 15 per cent. There is also some evidence that the SNP has lost many
of its former Leave voters and so has a more coherent pro-Europe base. None of this,
however, was enough to create a clear majority for independence.
 
Conclusion
38 At the time of writing, the Brexit saga has a long way to run but one thing is clear –
sovereignty in the old sense is more of a slogan than a practical reality in a complex
and interdependent world. Neither the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 nor
the Brexit referendum of 2016 could have brought back the old nation-state. Whatever
happens, Scotland, as Leruez showed all those years ago, remains a nation, a distinct
society  and,  increasingly  a  self-governing  community.  It  remains  without  a  state
because statehood itself no longer means what it once did but its future is unknown. 
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Since 1999 Scotland has a devolved Parliament and Government. The European Union provided
an important framework. EU membership reinforces ideas of shared and divided sovereignty.
Through the European Single Market it secures the internal market of the United Kingdom itself.
The  EU,  together  with  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  directly  applicable  in
Scotland,  separates  rights  from nationality.  Brexit  thus  destabilizes  the  domestic  devolution
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Depuis  1999,  l'Écosse  dispose  d'un  Parlement  et  d'un  gouvernement  autonome.  L’Union
européenne fournit un cadre externe pour cette dévolution du pouvoir. L’appartenance à l’Union
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écossaise.  Le  marché  unique  européen assure  le  marché  intérieur  du  Royaume-Uni.  Le  droit
communautaire, avec la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme (applicable directement
en Écosse) définit des droits humains sans référence à la nationalité. La sortie du Royaume-Uni de
l’Union européenne déstabilise donc le système.
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